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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16323 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by complaint and information 
with the crime of escape in violation of Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-8-309 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOI'ffiR COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County on January 15, 1979. The jury found him guilty 
as charged and he was sentenced by the court to a term of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges affirmance of the conviction and 
sentence of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A complaint charging appellant with the crime of 
escape was filed in circuit court on July 11, 1978 (R. 6). 
Following his arrest on July 25, 1978 (R. 4), an information 
was filed in District Court on August 31, 1978 (R. 7). 
Appellant plead not guilty on September 1, 1978 (R. 8), and 
trial was set for October 18, 1978 (R. 9). The date of 
trial was continued twice, on motion of defendant (R. 10, 12), 
so that other charges against appellant could be tried (R. 75-
76). Finally, on motion of the court, the matter was contiM~ 
from December 6, 1978, to January 15, 1979 (R. 19). Apparent; 
there was no judge available for the December 6 date (R. 76). 
There is no indication in the record on appeal that appellant 
ever demanded a trial or raised the speedy trial issue before 
his motion to dismiss at trial. In fact, appellant's counsel 
indicated to the trial court that he had waived the 90-day 
disposition "as to this case." (R. 76). (See Utah Code 
Ann., § 77-65-1). 
At appellant's trial, a copy of a judgment and 
commitment from the Third Judicial District indicating 
delivery of appellant to the prison by the sheriff was 
introduced into evidence (R. 122, and Exhibit lP). George 
Byron Stark, the criminal calendar clerk for the Third 
District Court, testified that the copy was a true and 
authenticated copy of the judgment and convict1on (R. 118) · 
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The papers indicated that appellant had been committed to 
a term of five years to life for aggrayated robbery (Exhibit 
lP) . Gregory L. Bown also testified that he was a deputy 
county attorney and that he was present when appellant 
plead guilty to the previous charge (R. 120, 121). 
Joy Greenwood, the record's clerk at the prison, 
testified that appellant's prison record contained no 
indication that he had ever been paroled, released or 
otherwise allowed to leave the prison (R. 131, 140). 
Carl Loerbs, a prison counselor, testified that 
on July 6, 1978, at 11:00 p.m., he conducted a bed check 
of the minimum security ward of the Utah State Prison and 
discovered that appellant was missing from his assigned 
bed (R. 106). The entire dormitory was searched and 
appellant's absence was reported to Mr. Loerbs' superiors 
(R. at 107). Ron Hinckley, another prison officer, 
testified that he and another officer searched the common 
areas, gym and culinary areas and the outside perimeter of 
minimum security. During their search, they discovered a 
door to a fan room which had been forced open through which 
appellant could have gained access to the outside. They 
then obtained an automobile and searched the roads around 
the prison, the freeway frontage road, and the Bluffdale road 
in an unsuccessful search for appellant (R. 114, 116). 
-3-
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Several weeks later, on July 22, 1978, South 
Salt Lake City Police officer Charles L. Illsley was 
patrolling near Lemel Circle at about 12:45 p.m., when he 
saw a 1973 Chevrolet pick-up with a large cardboard box 
in the bed. He followed the truck after putting his spotlig~ 
on it to determine what was in the back. After a few 
blocks, the truck stopped on its own and the driver got out 
and approached the police car. The driver appeared to have 
been drinking and his driver's license indicated that he 
was under the legal drinking age. Officer Illsley consequent) 
observed the interior of the truck and questioned the two 
other occupants. Appellant, one of the passengers, stated 
that his ncrme was Lee Stevens and that he lived at fifty-
fifty five Whl~e Cherry Way, but that he had no I.D. with 
him. Officer Illsley noticed a wallet on the floor of the 
truck in front of appellant. Within the wallet was prison 
identification for Ralph Menzies (appellant). Officer 
Illsley radioed dispatch to get a description of appellant 
for verification. The physical description, including a 
tattoo on his right forearm,matched and so Officer Illsley 
asked appellant his name again. Appellant replied, "You 
know who I am, you've got me." He asked the officer to 
retrieve his glasses which he had pushed under the truck 
seat (R. 124-128). 
-4-
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The jury found appellant guilty of escape, as 
charged. The court subsequently sentenced appellant to a 
term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, to 
commence from the time he normally would have been released 
as provided by the state statute (R. 58). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILT 
IN THIS CASE. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to 
support a jury verdict, it is well established that: 
The weight of evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses are reserved 
exclusively for the jury, and this 
Court will not interfere unless the 
evidence is found to be so lacking and 
insubstantial that reasonable men could 
not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonble doubt. Nor will we 
weigh conflicting evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, or the weight 
to be given appellant's testimony. 
Further, unless there is a clear showing 
of lack of evidence, the jury verdict 
will be upheld. 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-814 (Utah, 1977). See also 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976); State v. Fort. 
572 P.2d 1387 (Utah, 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 
(Utah, 1977); and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1977). 
The crime charged in the instant matter is set 
forth in Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-309 (1953), as amended: 
-5-
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(1} A person is guilty of escape 
if he escapes from official custody. 
(2} The offense is a felony of 
the second degree if; (b) the actor 
escapes from confinement in the state 
prison. 
(3} "Official custody," for the 
purpose of this section, means . 
custody in a penal institution . 
For purposes of this section a person is 
deemed to be confined in the Utah State 
Prison if he has been sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is 
not on parole. 
The evidence in the lower court indicated that there 
was a judgment and commitment for appellant to the Utah State 
Prison (Exhibit lP), and that appellant had not been paroled 
or had his sentence terminated or voided (R. 131-140). He 
was shown to have been missing from the prison and was, in 
fact, found without the prison in South Salt Lake. Finally, 
his own statement upon being found, "You know who I am, 
you've got me," would indicate that his absence from the priso: 
was knowingly without authorization. The evidence was 
clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict which must be 
affirmed. 
-6-
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POINT II. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT 
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court established criteria for determining 
whether the right to speedy trial has been violated. In 
Wingo; the defendant spent ten months in jail before posting 
bond. Four years after his release on bond, he was finally 
tried. The court found that the defendant had not been 
denied the right to speedy trial. The court rejected rigid 
guidelines for making the determination reaffirming its 
decision in Beavers v. Hanbert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905): 
The right of a speedy trial is 
necessarily relative. It is con-
sistent with delays and depends upon 
circumstances. It secures rights to a 
defendant. It does not preclude the 
rights of public justice. 
The court adopted a balancing test which approached 
each case on an individual basis and weighs four factors: 
length of delay, the reason for the delay, defendant's 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. 
This approach parallels the decisions of this 
Court with respect to the speedy trial issue. This Court 
has consistently noted that although there are statutory 
guidelines as to how long the Statemaywait before trying 
·-7-
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one charged by indictment or information (See Utah Code Ann., 
§§ 77-1-8 (6), and 77-65-1 (1953), as amended), these lengths 
are directory, not mandatory. State v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 
2d 201, 418 P.2d 134, 135 (1966). See also, State v. Mathis, 
7 Utah 2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957), and State v. Lozano, 
23 Utah 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969). 
In State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 P.2d 67 
(1973), this Court noted: 
[1] The right to a speedy trial 
assured by our Constitutions refers, 
of course, not to the speed at which 
a trial proceeds, but rather to the 
right of an accused to be brought to 
trial without undue delay. This is a 
right of ancient origin which arose 
because of abuses wherein people were 
kept in custody for unreasonable periods 
of time without trial and even without 
knowing what the charge may be against 
them. It is important as a safeguard 
against any abuse of that character. 
But in the absence thereof, it should 
not be extended as a mere abstraction 
of law in circumstances where there 
is no justification for its application. 
[2] The statement itself is general 
and thereis no particular length of time 
which can be specified as a standard in 
all instances in order to avoid infringement 
of the right. The correct application of 
the principle depends upon the facts of 
each case. The total picture should be 
looked at to see whether there has been 
any such abuse or imposition upon the 
accused as the provision was designed to 
protect against, so that he was prejudiced 
in having a fair trial and just treatment 
under the law. In making that determination, 
where there has been what may appear to be 
-8-
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Id. at 68. 
undue delay, it is important to 
consider whether or not there was 
justification for it including: 
(1) which party cause it; (2) whether 
it may have been wilful and/or for 
some improper purpose; (3) whether the 
defendant was aware of his rights; 
(4) whether he made known his desire 
for a speedy trial; (5) whether by words 
or conduct the~e was explicit or implicit 
waiver; and (6) whether the proceeding 
was completed as soon as reasonably 
could be done in the circumstances. 
See also, State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547 
(Utah, 1978). 
Finally, in State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 
P.2d 392, 395 (1968), this Court noted that: 
Even though there may be a delay 
between the time when an information 
or indictment is filed and the trial 
of the matter, a defendant cannot 
claim that his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial has been violated 
unless he asks the court to grant him 
a trial. 
In the instant matter, appellant never requested a 
trial. In fact, he requested that his trial be delayed. 
Half of the delay from information to trial was upon 
appellant's motion. The remainder of the time, two separate 
periods of six weeks each, was not oppressive or unreasonable. 
At the end of the first period, which extended from the 
date of appellant's plea to his first trial date, appellant 
moved for continuance. The second six-week period was 
occasioned because no judge was available on the appointed 
-9-
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trial date (See R. 76). During the entire period from 
arrest to trial, appellant was incarcerated pursuant to a 
lawf~l cowE.itment on a previous charge. Appellant has 
indicated no instance, nor is there any, where the delay 
caused harm to appellant or his case. 
In summary, there was no undue delay. Any delay 
was caused partially by appellant himself and partially 
by court requirements. There was no harm to appellant or 
his case. In short, there is no justification for the 
application of the speedy trial doctrine. Consequently, 
appellant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO 
DOuBLE JEOPARDY. 
Respondent notes that appellant's counsel has 
correctly stated the law with respect to double or former 
jeopardy and prison discipline. 
The unanimous consensus on that 
issue is that a defendant who is 
criminally prosecuted for escape from 
prison is not twice put in jeopardy 
even though he is subject to discipline 
by the prison board for his attempted 
escape. 
Appellant's brief, p. 20. 
- lC'-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's brief does not present any case law 
to the contrary, nor does there appear to be any. Consequently, 
appellant's claim of double jeopardy is without merit and 
his conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
There was more than enough evidence to reasonably 
sustain the jury verdict of guilt in this case. There was 
no undue delay in bringing the matter to trial, and what 
delay there was was not harmful to appellant or his case. 
There is no justification in this case for the application 
of the speedy trial doctrine. Finally, the courts have 
unanimously held that one who is punished by a prison 
board for escape and is also subjected to criminal prosecution 
for the crime of escape is not subjected to double jeopardy. 
For the above-stated reasons, respondent urges 
this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of 
appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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